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ABSTRACT
Introduction: In England, in 2006, new dental
contracts devolved commissioning of dental services
locally to Primary Care Trusts to meet the needs of their
local population. The new national General Dental
Services contracts (nGDS) were based on payment for
Units of Dental Activity (UDAs) awarded in three
treatment bands based on complexity of care. Recently,
contract currency in UK dentistry is evolving from UDAs
based on volume and case complexity towards ‘blended
contracts’ that include incentives linked with key
performance indicators such as quality and improved
health outcome. Overall, evidence of the effectiveness of
incentive-driven contracting of health providers is still
emerging. The INCENTIVE Study aims to evaluate a
blended contract model (incentive-driven) compared to
traditional nGDS contracts on dental service delivery in
practices in West Yorkshire, England.
Methods and analysis: The INCENTIVE model uses a
mixed methods approach to comprehensively evaluate a
new incentive-driven model of NHS dental service
delivery. The study includes 6 dental surgeries located
across three newly commissioned dental practices
(blended contract) and three existing traditional
practices (nGDS contracts). The newly commissioned
practices have been matched to traditional practices by
deprivation index, age profile, ethnicity, size of practice
and taking on new patients. The study consists of three
interlinked work packages: a qualitative study to explore
stakeholder perspectives of the new service delivery
model; an effectiveness study to assess the INCENTIVE
model in reducing the risk of and amount of dental
disease and enhance oral health-related quality of life in
patients; and an economic study to assess cost-
effectiveness of the INCENTIVE model in relation to
clinical status and oral health-related quality of life.
Ethics and dissemination: The study has been
approved by NRES Committee London, Bromley.
The results of this study will be disseminated at national
and international conferences and in international
journals.
INTRODUCTION
In England, in 2006, new dental contracts
devolved commissioning of dental services
locally to Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) to
meet the needs of their local population.
The new national General Dental Services
contracts (nGDS) were based on payment
for Units of Dental Activity (UDAs) awarded
in three treatment bands based on the
Strengths and limitations of this study
▪ The INCENTIVE model will ensure a robust
evaluation of dental practices piloting blended
dental contracts that reflect innovative use of skill
mix, evidence-based care pathways, funding and
quality indicators.
▪ A rigorous mixed methods scientific approach
will add considerable evidence over and above
any evaluations of the pilots being undertaken,
which are largely limited to survey-based
evaluations.
▪ While this is not a randomised controlled trial,
the mixed methods offer insight into not only
effectiveness and cost-effectiveness but also into
the process of contractual change for the stake-
holders, which is important for any subsequent
national roll out and implementation of the new
dental contracts.
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complexity of each patient’s care. The contracted
number of UDAs was based on historic activity. The
nGDS contracts meant that the payment mechanism
changed from a one-off fee per item of service to a
system whereby providers are paid an annual sum in
return for delivering an agreed number of ‘courses of
treatment’ weighted for complexity.
There is an increasing trend to use incentives in UK
NHS primary care.1 Within dentistry this manifests as
changes to dental practitioners’ contractual arrange-
ments. Local commissioning allowed modiﬁcations that
may have been inﬂuenced by the Steele Review2 of NHS
dentistry, which recommended that payments explicitly
recognise prevention and reward the contribution of the
dental team to improvements to oral health, reﬂected in patient
progression along the pathway, compliance with nationally
agreed clinical guidelines and the achievement of expected out-
comes (ref. 2, p.67). In addition, commissioners were
asked to support dentists to make best and most cost effective
use of the available dental workforce.2
Thus contract currency in UK dentistry is evolving from
UDAs based on volume and case complexity towards
‘blended contracts’ that include incentives linked with
key performance indicators such as quality and improved
health outcome.2 Overall, evidence of the effectiveness of
incentive-driven contracting of health providers is still
emerging. A review by Christianson et al3 found mixed
results of the effect of payer initiatives that reward provi-
ders for quality improvements whereas Clarkson et al4
found targeted payments to be a cost-effective interven-
tion in changing a clinician’s behaviour, with signiﬁcant
improvement in professional practice.4 O’Donnell et al5
found within the new General Medical Services contracts
in primary care that the Quality and Outcomes
Framework (QOF) incentivised performance, motivating
staff towards QOF targets. Similarly, a review by
McDonald et al1 of the effect of incentives on the primary
care workforce found them to be powerful motivators. A
more granular view suggests that their process-based
nature may limit their long-term effects on health out-
comes.6 There is also a danger that important activities
that lack a target may be underemphasised.6 7
In order to inform an appropriate model of care to
maintain and improve oral health, a number of dental
contracts have been locally commissioned focused on
oral health improvement and quality, in addition,
national pilots are underway in England developed by
the Department of Health. All share common features
of being capitation based, of having a quality element,
of conferring a responsibility for long-term care of the
patient on the contract holder and of being based on an
oral health assessment (OHA) and pathway.8
The INCENTIVE Study aims to evaluate a blended
contract model (incentive-driven) compared to trad-
itional nGDS contracts on dental service delivery in prac-
tices in West Yorkshire, England to generate information
that will be of value for designing and commissioning
future NHS dental services.
METHODS AND ANALYSIS
Study objectives
▸ To explore stakeholder perspectives of the new
blended contract service delivery model. We will also
explore whether these practices already operating an
incentive-driven service delivery by a multidisciplinary
team are able to adapt more readily to the introduc-
tion of further new dental contracts as these will be
negotiated during the study period.
▸ To assess the effectiveness of the new service delivery
model in reducing the risk of and amount of dental
disease and enhancing oral health-related quality of
life in patients.
▸ To assess cost-effectiveness of the new service delivery
model in relation to oral health-related quality of life.
Design
The INCENTIVE model will use a mixed methods
approach combining qualitative and quantitative techni-
ques to comprehensively evaluate a new incentive-driven
model of NHS dental service delivery. The study will
include 6 dental surgeries located across three newly
commissioned dental practices (blended contract) and
three existing traditional practices (nGDS contracts) in
West Yorkshire (3 in each of the two arms). The newly
commissioned practices have been matched to trad-
itional practices by deprivation index, age proﬁle, ethni-
city, size of practice and taking on new patients.
The study consists of three interlinked work packages:
a qualitative study to explore stakeholder perspectives of
the new service delivery model and whether those prac-
tices already operating incentive-driven service delivery
by a multidisciplinary team are ready to adapt more
readily to a new dental contract; an effectiveness study
to assess the effectiveness of the INCENTIVE model in
reducing the risk of and amount of dental disease and
enhance oral health-related quality of life in patients;
and a cost-effectiveness study to assess cost-effectiveness
of the INCENTIVE model in relation to clinical status
and oral health-related quality of life. An overview of the
study incorporating the three work packages is con-
tained in ﬁgure 1.
Setting
Focus lies on a new blended dental contract introduced
in 2007 for three newly commissioned NHS dental prac-
tices in West Yorkshire. The speciﬁcation was innovative
and although pre-dating the Steele Review,2 it reﬂected
its ethos and recommendations with emphasis on quality
of care, achieving health outcomes and patient-reported
outcome measures (PROMS).9
In brief, 60% of the contract value is apportioned to
delivery of a set number of UDAs. The remaining 40%
is dependent on the delivery of quality—20% systems,
processes, infrastructure (eg, dental standards of quality
and safety overseen by The Care Quality Commission)
and 20% oral health improvement (OHImp). The
framework is an evolving mechanism for improving oral
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health and monitoring outcomes within the practices.
The outcomes for year 1 involved focusing on ensuring
that the foundations were in place for the care pathway
approach to evidence-based preventive care, including
appropriate skill mix, staff training, reviewing practice
and community proﬁles.
The new contracts are aimed at: ensuring that
evidence-based preventive interventions10 are delivered
Figure 1 Flow diagram INCENTIVE study.
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in line with identiﬁed needs for a deﬁned population;
ensuring increased access to dentistry; and ensuring that
care is provided by the most appropriate team member
to encourage skill mix. All practices fully utilise skill mix
and have hygiene therapists and additional skills dental
nurses.
The contracts encourage a care pathway approach in
which all patients should be assessed formally on joining
the practice and at each subsequent recall. Four sets of
information (age group, medical history, social history
(self-care, habits/diet) and clinical assessment) are used
to inform a trafﬁc-light system for patients with high (red),
medium (amber) or low (green) risk of oral disease (refer
to ﬁgure 2). This type of trafﬁc-light system has not been
fully explored, although early work is ongoing in the
North West of England.11 The patient care pathway
includes evidence-based prevention and advice, appropri-
ate recall interval and restorative care as appropriate (red
risk category treatment being limited to stabilisation and
lowering risk status). Patients’ status is reviewed at their
next OHA allowing them to move between risk categories.
Within practice monitoring ensures evidence-based
prevention is delivered in line with identiﬁed needs and
monitors access to dentistry. Oral health improvement is
assessed through the delivery of a performance frame-
work. Payment is linked to three elements: a register by
age group of those having risk assessment, management
of care appropriate to need and evidence base, and the
measurement of oral health outcomes.
Qualitative study
A qualitative study will explore the meaning of key
aspects of the new service delivery model for three dis-
crete stakeholder groups: (1) public and patients (ie,
both non-patients and patients); (2) commissioners and
(3) the primary care dental teams. Preliminary observa-
tional studies will help develop topic guides for subse-
quent semistructured interviews and focus groups.
Recruitment will continue until no new variation in
observations can be found (saturation). If necessary,
additional participants will be identiﬁed using theoret-
ical sampling. For planning purposes, we anticipate con-
ducting approximately ﬁve interviews, with three focus
groups having four or more participants within each
stakeholder group.
The sampling matrix for the public and patient group
will include criteria linked to the objectives of the pro-
gramme, including demographic factors (age, gender,
ethnicity, socioeconomic status), risk category, treatment
need and participation in the user forum. Broad eligibil-
ity criteria at the participating practices will recruit
patients: aged 16 years and over; willing to be inter-
viewed and to give informed consent; if a translator is
needed provision of translation services in the spoken
language of the participant will be available via the
normal dental practice access routes to such services.
As the new contracting model considers access to care
it is important that the sample includes non-patients.
A mixture of approaches will be used to recruit
people who may not engage with local dental care ser-
vices, such as the employment of snowball sampling
techniques and site-based approaches to recruitment.
However, snowball sampling used alone can result in
biased samples and it is important that any sample
recruited to the study adequately represents the target
population. In order to achieve this goal speciﬁc atten-
tion may be required for adequate recruitment of parti-
cipants from different groups of the community.
Therefore, a site-based approach will be used to control
bias and obtain a more representative sample. A repre-
sentative list of sites (eg, places, organisations or ser-
vices), which may include churches, community
centres, social clubs or housing projects, will be identi-
ﬁed, with the researcher contacting the ‘gatekeeper’ for
each of these sites (eg, church pastor) so that the study
can be explained; the gatekeeper’s help in recruitment
can also be enlisted and the researcher can collect
information about the number and characteristics of
site members.
Commissioners will comprise commissioning staff,
general dental practice advisors and consultants in
Dental Public Health. Staff members will be recruited
from the primary care dental teams from the six partici-
pating practices as well as those that may have recently
left them as it is important to capture the potential
impact of working under these different models of
service delivery and their professional satisfaction. Staff
will comprise the full skill mix within the practices. As
with previous work,1 we will pay particular attention to
the way in which the INCENTIVE model promotes
greater participation from the entire dental team.
Transcripts of the interviews and focus groups will be
analysed with framework analysis. The ﬁrst stage will
involve familiarisation with the data to verify and, if
necessary, revise the framework in the light of emerging
themes. The revised framework forms an index, allowing
the data in the transcripts to be labelled according to
each theme. The data will then be sorted by theme to
enable constant comparison across themes and cases.
The goal of our analysis will be to establish typologies
for participation, health improvement, access, profes-
sional involvement and care pathways. These typologies
will identify the general nature of each of these aspects
and will enable us to analyse the way in which the emer-
ging model can develop new directions for primary care
dentistry. The ﬁndings will be triangulated with a range
of literatures including deﬁnitions of health, current
policy, access, quality and public involvement.
The study focuses on innovative commissioning
models that are commissioned within a real-world envir-
onment. Should a new national contract or indeed local
commissioning arrangements be introduced during the
study period, the study will examine the impact of the
change and differences between the innovative and trad-
itional models in adapting to implementing the new
contractual model.
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Effectiveness study
The key characteristics of the traditional and new model
incentive-driven practices are summarised in table 1. A
non-randomised natural experiment will compare three
incentive-driven dental practices with the three matched
traditional practices. The practices are matched by size,
number of dentists, location and patient demographics.
The primary outcome will be gingivitis measured as the
proportion of sites that bleed on probing (BOP).
Secondary/exploratory outcomes include oral
health-related quality of life (OHIP-14) and generic
health-related quality of life (EQ-5D). The dental caries
experience will be recorded using the International
Caries Detection and Assessment System (ICDAS).
To achieve a recruitment of 550 new patients in the
INCENTIVE project, recruitment will take place over
the six practices for a period of 6 months. We anticipate
10% lost to follow-up so this leaves us with an adequate
sample of ∼500 for analysis. Recruitment is based on:
(1) six dental practices included in the study that com-
prise 20 surgeries; (2) an average list size of 1000 adult
patients per dentist; (3) 10% of whom per year will be
new patients to the practice (estimated from the Dental
Public Health audit ﬁgures of practices in Bradford and
Airedale) and (4) of these 1000 patients we estimate a
minimum of 50% will agree to participate in the study
over the 6-month recruitment period. Thus at a prac-
tice level the three newly commissioned dental practices
will be matched with three existing traditional practices
of similar size, deprivation index, age proﬁle and ethni-
city, which are taking on new patients. At a patient
level, inclusion criteria are that a patient must be above
16 years of age, must be a new patient to the practice
during the recruitment period (anticipated being
6 months) willing to be followed up for 24 months, and
must give informed consent and be able to complete
the patient-completed questionnaires (if a translator is
needed, the availability of provision of translation
service in the spoken language of the participant will
be via the normal dental practice access routes to such
services). With regard to exclusion criteria and the spe-
ciﬁc handling of those who are edentulous, they will
not be excluded from the sample, however, they will be
considered supplementary to the core sample of 550
patients and provide additional speciﬁc data. Postcode,
age and ethnicity of all patients included within the
sample will be recorded and proﬁled during the
analysis.
To detect a clinically meaningful reduction in BOP of
10% and assuming a 10% drop out rate, 275 patients are
required in from the incentive-driven practices and from
the nGDS practices to give 80% power with a signiﬁ-
cance level of 5%.
Data will be collected at baseline and 24 months. BOP
and ICDAS will be completed by the dental practitioner
at the dental appointment. Training will be provided to
all practices on use of the ICDAS. For the risk assessment,
data from the trafﬁc light system (refer to ﬁgure 2) will be
collected outlining variations when the protocol is over-
ruled by clinicians and why. Recruitment will take place
over a 6-month period beginning in April 2012. The
OHIP-14 and EQ-5D will be completed by the patients.
Multiple linear regression will be used to model differ-
ences in BOP from baseline to 24 months. Changes in
oral health quality of life will be explored using struc-
tural equation modelling to identify the relationships
between changes in clinical status and patient
perspective.
Figure 2 ‘Traffic Light’ risk assessment.
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Cost-effectiveness study
Of key importance is that the new model of service deliv-
ery shows value for money. Economic evaluation will
identify within-study incremental cost-effectiveness ratios
for the incentive-driven service as compared to standard
practice. Use of these ratios will enable comparison of
any additional ﬁnancial costs and beneﬁts associated
with the new model over standard care.
The primary analyses will take the perspective of the
commissioners of the service, taking account of differ-
ences in contractual payments and including only the
costs of dental care. There is no preference-based dental
outcome measure and thus the within-study analysis will
estimate the expected incremental cost per point
increase in OHIP-14 score. In addition, a second analysis
will use quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) estimated
using utility weights for each health state observed in the
trial population. We will use the EuroQol-5D (EQ-5D)
instrument for this purpose.12 13 Within the study the
OHIP-14 scores will also be mapped to the EQ-5D scores
in order to add to the evidence base14 for the future
development of a preference-based dental health-related
quality of life instrument.
While the primary analyses will adopt the commis-
sioner perspective, secondary analysis will adopt the per-
spective of the service provider. Integral to this analysis
is the exploration of variation of cost-effectiveness results
across locations given differences in case and skill mix.
Thus the economic analysis will explore the differences
in resource use given the skill mix and care providers by
comparing cost and output across the new incentive-
driven model of service delivery and traditional
practices.
The economic study will use the same sample and
time frame as the clinical study. Health resource use
associated with each treatment modality will be collected
for each dental visit from dental practice records. The
EQ-5D and OHIP-14 will be collected at the same time
as the other outcome data. Patients will be asked to com-
plete these measures at baseline and 24 months.
Incremental cost-effectiveness ratios will be calculated
as the difference between the mean costs and difference
in OHIP score/QALYs in each arm. Non-parametric
bootstrapping will be used to produce a within-trial
probabilistic sensitivity analysis of the incremental cost-
effectiveness ratios. The expected incremental cost-
effectiveness ratio, a scatterplot on the cost-effectiveness
plane and the cost-effectiveness acceptability frontier
will be presented. Discounting will use the recom-
mended rate at the time.
DISCUSSION
The move to blended or incentivised contracts is gather-
ing pace within the UK, yet there is mixed evidence on its
usefulness. There are potential advantages; not least
more efﬁcient use of the dental team through greater use
of skill mix. For example, dental therapists can extract
Table 1 Key characteristics of the traditional and new model incentive practices under evaluation in the INCENTIVE study
Characteristics
Traditional (comparator)
practices (3 practices; 10 dental
surgeries) Incentive practices (3 practices; 10 dental surgeries)
Model of operation Traditional Incentive driven
Contract type nGDS0 An incentive-driven contract (a blended contract
combining nGDS and incentives)
Mode of reimbursement Activity-based, weighted bands of
dental activity
Contract currency—UDA
Activity: 60% of contract value UDAs
Incentives: (1) Quality systems, processes infrastructure
(eg, cross infection, standards for better health 0: 20%
of contract value, and (2) Oral health improvement: 20%
contract value
Incentives and levers Driven by delivery of UDAs, with no
incentives for prevention approach
Allocation of payment allows commissioners to
incentivise key structures, processes and outcomes for
quality and oral health improvement
Health professional
responsible for delivery of
care
Dentist (with no incentives for
therapist and hygienist support)
Blended contract incentivises use of skill mix to deliver
preventative focused care
For example, dental therapists can extract baby teeth,
place fillings and apply preventative medicaments.
Dental nurses may give preventative fluoride varnish to
teeth
Care pathway and recall Care pathway and recall as
prescribed by individual performers
Risk assessed (traffic light system) evidence based
preventative care pathway
Risk assessed recall interval (NICE guidelines on dental
recall interval), variations recorded
Stakeholder feedback on
delivery and impact of care
Standard complaints/comments Patient forum
nGDS, national General Dental Services; NICE, National Institute for Health and Care Excellence; UDA, Units of Dental Activity.
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milk teeth, place ﬁllings and apply preventive medica-
ments, and dental nurses may give preventive advice and
apply preventive ﬂuoride varnishes to teeth. Intuitively,
the delegation of treatment to staff specialised in only a
speciﬁc range of treatments could reduce costs and
increase access to care but this hypothesis needs testing.15
Skill mix is advocated in several current proposals for
change that continue a trend seen in UK dentistry over
the past 20 years.2 16–19 For example, dental therapists
may now work in general dental practice,17 their clinical
remit has expanded20 21 and recently, in March 2013, the
GDC (General Dental Council) permitted direct access
to some dental care professionals; hygienists and thera-
pists can now carry out their full scope of practice
without prescription and without the patient having to
see a dentist ﬁrst. While there are few hard data to
support skill mix in dentistry,15 some data are beginning
to emerge; for example, a recent practice-based study
found the success of ﬁssure sealants placed by
dentists, hygienists and therapists to be comparable.22
However, research is needed to assess whether new
models of delivery and service design will encourage
their use and whether they are acceptable to dentists and
patients.
Emphasis of the new incentivised contracts lies on
quality and outcomes. While quality indicators linked to
contracts and payments have been used widely in other
branches of healthcare, the results are complex. The
indicators can drive organisational change towards best
practice, but may also be a disincentive to important but
non-rewarded activities.7 Used alongside demographic
data, the indicators can measure practice performance,
identify areas for development and assist sharing of best
practice.23 The indicators often increase the quantity of
service provision, but not always the quality.24 While
offering great potential, quality indicators have not been
comprehensively evaluated in dentistry. A recent system-
atic review was only able to provide a framework for how
such indicators might work.25
In respect of improved health outcomes, the dental
community is united that outcomes in terms of clinical
effectiveness should focus on major public health chal-
lenges including caries and periodontal diseases where
health improvement is needed. However, the community
lacks consensus in how best to measure change.
There is also little in the literature regarding care
pathways in primary dental care, although the concept
has been around for a number of years. The concepts
and beneﬁts of the care pathway approach in dental
primary care were described by Hally and Pitts.26 As a
result of government recommendations17 the ﬁrst widely
disseminated care pathway in UK dental primary care
was the OHA within the National Institute for Health
and Care Excellence guidance on dental recall inter-
vals.27 The OHA care pathway was designed to enable
more prevention within personalised care plans taking
into account their social and dental histories as well as
clinical ﬁndings. This pathway informs what to
commission from the practices involved in this study but
has not been fully evaluated in practice.
The emerging service delivery models in the UK
should include innovative use of skill mix, evidence-
based care pathways, funding and quality indicators.18
A robust evaluation of new dental contracts is called
for,1 which is what this study aims to achieve.
Study status
The ﬁrst patient for the effectiveness and cost-
effectiveness studies was recruited in June 2012 and the
last patient in January 2013. Recruitment for the qualita-
tive study is on-going. The results will be reported in
2015. The research team provided the NRES Committee
London-Bromley with a copy of the ﬁnal protocol,
patient information sheets, consent forms and all other
relevant study documentation.
Consent
The direct NHS Dental team will perform an eligibility
screen of all new patients to the practice based on the
information the practice routinely captures when a
patient joins the practice. Eligible patients will be given a
patient information leaﬂet to consider, if they are willing
to join INCENTIVE they will be consented and regis-
tered. This will result in them being assigned a unique
patient-speciﬁc study number that will then be used on
all subsequent case report forms for data capture. For lay
participants who are not currently seeing an NHS dentist
but whom we would like to interview to understand
access to dental care in the community, we will recruit
using a mixture of approaches, such as the employment
of snowball sampling techniques and site-based
approaches to recruitment. Snowball sampling is a con-
venience sampling technique which involves an existing
participant providing the researcher with the name of an
individual who may also be interested in taking part in
the research. This individual may be asked, in turn, to
provide the researcher with a name of another potential
participant. One of the main advantages of this method
of recruitment is that it enables researchers to make
contact with hard to reach populations.
Confidentiality
Access to medical records: Monitoring of patient notes may
be undertaken by the authorised individuals from the
study team, regulatory bodies, funder or Sponsor
(University of Leeds) in order to check that the study is
being carried out correctly. The Clinical Research coord-
inator will be University of Leeds employed and have
oversight of day-to-day operations across work package
(WP)1–3. There will be a similar research assistant coord-
inating the qualitative Workpackage 1 based in the
University of Shefﬁeld. Electronic transfer: data will be
sent to and from participating research sites, however, no
patient-identiﬁable information will be sent via electronic
means (use of coded study number, patient initials and
date of birth (DOB) only). Should it be required to send
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any patient identiﬁable information (eg, for long-term
follow-up data), then data will be sent password protected
(with a complex password to be sent separately) to the
appropriate person. We follow local guidance and
Standard Operating Procedures, which ensure the Data
Protection Act 1998 will be adhered to at all times.
Use of personal postcode: Patient 4 digit postcode will
be collected on the Consent Form for the trial, and will be
kept separately to any other clinical data. The postcode
and full name are being collected to allow for collection of
deprivation index from standard local registries.
The research team and participating sites will comply
with all aspects of the Data Protection Act 1998. All
information collected during the course of the study will
be kept strictly conﬁdential. Participant name will be col-
lected when the patient consents to the trial for long-
term follow-up. All other data collection forms, except
the consent form that contains the patient’s signature,
which are transferred to or from the research team at
University of Leeds or University of Shefﬁeld will be
coded with a unique study number and will include two
patient identiﬁers: initials and date of birth.
Dissemination policy
An end of project national dissemination meeting will be
undertaken with dental commissioners and a lay
summary of project ﬁndings for circulation to study parti-
cipants. It is anticipated that there will be two publica-
tions in international peer reviewed, high-impact journals
and conference dissemination at the National meeting of
the British Dental Association or equivalent and the
International American Dental Research or equivalent.
The chief investigator, co-applicants and senior man-
agement staff will be named as authors in any publica-
tion, and an appropriate ﬁrst author agreed through
discussion among the Study Management Group (SMG)
members. In addition, all collaborators will be listed as
contributors for the main study publication, giving
details of their roles in planning, conducting and report-
ing the study. The INCENTIVE team will be acknowl-
edged in all publications, as will the funder. Other key
individuals will be included as authors or contributors as
appropriate and at the discretion of the SMG. Any dis-
putes relating to authorship will be resolved by the
Senior Advisory Board/Steering Committee (SAB).
The Chairs and Independent members of the SAB
will be acknowledged, but will not qualify for full author-
ship, in order to maintain their independence.
To maintain the scientiﬁc integrity of the study, data
will not be released prior to the ﬁrst publication of the
results of the primary endpoint analysis, either for study
publication or oral presentation purposes, without the
permission of the SMG.
The SMG will agree a publication plan and must be con-
sulted prior to release or publication of any study data.
Individual collaborators must not publish data concern-
ing their participants which are directly relevant to the
questions posed in the study until the main results of the
study have been published. Local collaborators may not
have access to study data until after publication of the
main study results unless with agreement of the SMG.
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